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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
to stipulate will be of limited effect, the Cook decision forces adversary
proceedings in situations where the parties might otherwise be ame-
nable to early settlement. If no evidence of fraud exists in a situation
such as this, there is no reason whatsoever for denying priority to the
litigant who aids himself and thereby reduces the courts' burden.
ARTICLE 55- APPEALs GENERALLY
CPLR 5514(a): Time extension unnecessary when appeal is transferred
pursuant to New York State Constitution.
The Court of Appeals decision in Ryan v. Freeman202 is illustra-
tive of an appellate court's duty to transfer an appeal pursuant to
Article 6, section 5b, of the New York State Constitution.20 3 In Ryan,
the plaintiff erroneously appealed to the Court from an order of the
Civil Court of the City of New York denying his motion for a jury
trial. Obviously realizing his error, he made a motion in the Court to
transfer the appeal to the appellate term or, in the alternative, to have
the appeal dismissed without prejudice in accordance with CPLR
5514(a). 204 The Court of Appeals granted the motion to transfer pur-
suant to section 5b of the state constitution's judiciary article.
It should be noted that a dismissal pursuant to CPLR 5514(a)
invokes that section's time-extension provision, and an appellant would
then have thirty days from the date of dismissal to appeal to the
proper court.20 5 However, this saving provision is superfluous when
article 6 governs since the necessity of a new appeal is obviated due
to the fact that a transfer, and not a dismissal of the appeal or denial
of the motion to appeal, is mandated.20
ARTICLE 62 - ATTACHMENT
CPLR 6214: Property seized by sheriff pursuant to ineffective levy may
be retained under valid order of attachment without loss of priority.
202 24 N.Y.2d 942, 250 N.E.2d 67, 302 N.Y.S.2d 579 (1969).
203 N.Y. CoNsr. art. VI, § 5b:
If any appeal is taken to an appellate court which is not authorized to review
such judgment or order, the court shall transfer the appeal to an appellate court
which is authorized to review such judgment or order.
204 CPLR 5514(a) provides that
[i]f an appeal is taken or a motion for permission to appeal is made and such
appeal is dismissed or motion is denied and, except for time limitations in sec-
tion 5513, some other method of taking an appeal or of seeking permission to
appeal is available, the time limited for such other method shall be computed
from the dismissal or denial, unless the court to which the appeal is sought to
be taken orders otherwise.
205 CPLR 5513. 7 WK&M 5514.01 (1969).
206 7 WK&M 5514.01 (1969).
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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
Orders of attachment, when valid, have a continuing effect; 207 i.e.,
all debts of a third person due the defendant at the time of the
levy, as well as those coming due thereafter, shall be subject to the
levy.208 CPLR 6214(e), however, dictates that a levy on personal prop-
erty becomes void "[a]t the expiration of ninety days after a levy is
made by service of the order of attachment," unless the levy falls within
one of three exceptions to the ninety-day rule.209 If the levy is so
voided under 6214(e), the defendant's property may be subject to the
rights of an intervening creditor, and the garnishor-plaintiff may not
then obtain the priority he sought by originally employing the pro-
cedural device.
In Freedom Discount Corp. v. Clune,2 0 plaintiff entered a default
judgment on a cause of action to recover upon a retail installment-
sale agreement, but defendant successfully moved to vacate the judg-
ment. However, prior to the time the judgment was actually vacated,
plaintiff obtained an order of attachment, and a sheriff levied on de-
fendant's wages; 10 percent of the wages then due the defendant
were given to the sheriff.21' More than ninety days after the attach-
ment order had been obtained, the plaintiff, insisting that the original
judgment was still valid, had an income execution issued.212 Defen-
dant's employer thereupon remitted an additional sum of money to
the sheriff.
The defendant moved to have the second sum of money returned
to him. The motion was granted, and an appropriate order was entered.
Special term, however, also held that plaintiff's order of attachment
had expired ninety days after the date it was issued. Immediately after
this decision was rendered, plaintiff requested the sheriff to levy upon
the second sum of money, which he was still holding pursuant to the
original attachment order. Defendant then made a second motion to
compel the plaintiff and sheriff to comply with the order of the special
term, and this motion was also granted.
207 See 7A WK&M 6214.07 (1969).
208 CPLR 6214(b). This provision of the CPLR changed the former procedure. Under
the previous provision, a levy was only valid as to property of the defendant "owing to
him . . . [and] . . . held or owed by the person on whom it is served." CPA 917(2).
209 A levy will remain effective beyond the ninety days in the following three in-
stances: (1) the property or debts have been actually collected and received by the sheriff;
(2) the property or debts have become the subject of a special proceeding; or (3) a court
has extended the period. See 7A WK&M 6214.14 (1969).
210 32 App. Div. 2d 833, 320 N.Y.S.2d 465 (2d Dep't 1969).
211 CPLR 5231(b) specifically provides that where any person is receiving or will re-
ceive more than thirty dollars per week, no more than ten percent of this amount may be
issued and delivered to the sheriff.
212 See CPLR 5231.
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On plaintiff's appeals from both orders, the Second Department
held that the ninety-day expiration provision contained in CPLR
6214(e) pertains to a notice of levy and not an attachment order. There-
fore, since the attachment order remained valid, the second sum of
money could be retained pursuant thereto.
The result achieved is clearly correct. For, a determination that
the attachment order expired at the end of the ninety days would con-
tradict the provisions of CPLR 6224.213 Moreover, a different result
would have required the return of the money, a new levy and an addi-
tional seizure, and the plaintiff's claim might have been subordinated
to the claim of an intervening creditor. Even though a court can now
extend a notice of levy after the ninety-day period has expired,214 there
appears to be no justification for requiring a new seizure in circum-
stances such as these.
However, one should carefully scrutinize the facts present in the
instant case. The default judgment was vacated, but the action was
still pending. Had the action been dismissed, e.g., for lack of jurisdic-
tion of the person, a different result would be warranted. In such an
instance, and in similar situations, no justification would exist for giv-
ing the plaintiff priority over a creditor who attached property before
the plaintiff could institute a new action.
ARTICLE 65- NOTICE OF PENDENCY
CPLR 6513: Section is self-executing; court may not deny CPLR 6514
motion to cancel if notice of pendency is more than three years old.
New York at one time followed the common-law rule which de-
clared that a notice of pendency was effective until the termination
of the action.21 5 However, with the enactment of the CPA216 and the
subsequent adoption of the CPLR,217 a lis pendens is subject to a
definite time limit unless extended by court order. CPLR 6513 mandates
that "[a] notice of pendency shall be effective for a period of three
years ... [unless] ... [a]n extension order shall be filed, recorded and
indexed before expiration of the prior period."
213 CPLR 6224 governs the expiration of an attachment order:
An order of attachment is annulled when the action in which it was granted
abates or is discontinued, or a judgment entered therein in favor of the plaintiff
is fully satisfied, or a judgment is entered therein in favor of the defendant....
214 See Seider v. Roth, 28 App. Div. 2d 698, 280 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (2d Dep't 1967). For
an extensive analysis of the recent developments relating to CPLR 6214 see 7B McKINNEY'S
CPLR 6214, supp. commentary 33-34 (1968).
215 See 7A WK&M 6513.01 (1969).
216 CPA 121(a).
217 CPLR 6513.
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